Baghdad in color versus Baghdad in rhetoric

In last night's presidential debate Senator John McCain continued to hit on the theme that the so-called "Surge" in Iraq has been a remarkable success. The reason for the recent fall in violence is an open question, but some of it is surely due to the "Surge", that is more boots on the ground, but there are other reasons for the decline in violence, namely, the bribes we've been paying to the Sunni insurgents, and the ethnic cleansing in Baghdad. Also, there is the more important question of how much progress has been made in reconciling Iraq's warring factions. Moreover, if we are "winning," in Iraq, as Senator McCain, never fails to remind us, then when can we expect the Iraqi government to be able to govern on its own? Sadly, Senator McCain didn't have answer.

What kind of success is the "Surge?" Was it a brilliant tactic that won the war for us, and turned Iraq away from the brink of a full-scale civil war and onto the path of liberal democracy and economic prosperity?

Here is a telling video shot by an Iraqi journalist who witnessed the "success" of the Surge first hand. He now calls Baghdad a "city of walls." As you watch the video ask yourself if you think that Baghdad looks like a city that is prosperous and open, that has a well-developed civic ethic, that is strong and united, and that possesses all the spontaneous delights of a happy community?

The "success" of the Surge in color:

The 'Surge' comes under fire

It is now becoming part of the accepted wisdom that the 'Surge' has been successful in bringing down the level of violence in Iraq. While it is fortunate that violence in Iraq has declined, it's not clear that the Surge is wholly responsible for this. In a previous post I cited the work of conservative columnist Paul Sperry who suggested the Surge not only involved increasing the number of troops in Iraq, especially in Baghdad, but also involved handing out cash bribes to Sunnis to cease resisting the U.S. occupation.

Confirmation for this continues to roll in, but I find it amazing that the media -- especially the so-called liberal media -- seems reluctant to report these findings. I encourage everyone to read Steve Simon's essay in Foreign Affairs The Price of the Surge, because he provides a more even-handed analysis of the Surge. Violence has gone down, yes, but at what cost? And are we any closer to establishing a political reconciliation among Iraq's various ethnic enclaves?

However, he does discuss the cash 'bribes' we've been providing to the Sunnis and why this has been a significant factor in alleviating the violence in Iraq. He writes :

"The deals were mediated by tribal leaders and consisted of payments of $360 per month per combatant in exchange for allegiance and cooperation. Initially referred to by the United States as 'concerned local citizens,' the former insurgents are now known as the Sons of Iraq. The total number across Iraq is estimated at over 90,000.

The Sunni sheiks, meanwhile, are getting rich from the surge. The United States has budgeted $150 million to pay Sunni tribal groups this year, and the sheiks take as much as 20 percent of every payment to a former insurgent -- which means that commanding 200 fighters can be worth well over a hundred thousand dollars a year for a tribal chief."

It's important to note that these are former Sunni insurgents, that is "terrorists," who have been responsible for killing Americans. But because the United States could not find a way to militarily bring down the violence and the war was becoming increasingly unpopular at home it seems a silent deal was struck between the commanders on the ground and the Sunnis. So far the 'bribes' seem to be working, but is this really much of a success?

The author also notes that the ethnic cleansing that went on in 2006 and early 2007 segregated the Shiites and Sunnis so that now they live in their own communities. A recent study done by professors at the University of California at Los Angeles confirms this.

Night light in neighborhoods populated primarily by embattled Sunni residents declined dramatically just before the February 2007 surge and never returned, suggesting that ethnic cleansing by rival Shiites may have been largely responsible for the decrease in violence for which the U.S. military has claimed credit, the team reports in a new study based on publicly available satellite imagery.

It seems premature to declare the Surge a success because clearly other factors are at play. Finally, though, we should remember that the ultimate purpose of the Surge was not just to decrease the level of violence in Iraq, but to provide the embattled Iraqi government time to reconcile with dissident factions. While no one knows the future of Iraq, we do know that we had no cause to invade and occupy Iraq and all the "successes" in Iraq are ultimately for naught.